
**From Narcissism to the Dialogic: Identity in Art after the Internet**  
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In 1976, in her influential theorisation of video art, Rosalind Krauss used the prevalence of video works featuring monologues delivered directly to the camera to call the aesthetics of video one of ‘narcissism’.¹ In digital work and work that is loosely associated with the post-internet art generation in a UK-US context today, one is struck instead by the prevalence of the dialogue as a format. The high incidence of such a form suggests a shift from how identity was conceived and presented in a pre-internet age: the dialogue implies a mode of extreme publicity — the spectre of a respondent always on the horizon.

A number of recent works using dialogue mimic existing formats, such as that of TV interviews in Josh Kline’s videos *Forever 27* and *Forever 28* (both 2013), which feature Q&As between dead celebrities and entertainment reporters, or Alex Israel’s *As It Lays* (2012) series of interviews. Frances Stark’s *My Best Thing* (2011), meanwhile, re-creates a dialogue in an online sex chat room. Others stage scenes — take Ed Atkins’s two-screen *Us Dead Talk Love* (2012), which represents a conversation between two cadavers — while still others actively generate a back-and-forth with either the internet user or the internet itself. In Cécile B. Evans’s *AGNES* (2013) project for the Serpentine Galleries in London, the bot Agnes interacts with users of the Serpentine website; Erica Scourti conducts a conversation with herself via Google algorithms in *Life in AdWords* (2012–13).² Liz Magic Laser’s performance *I Feel Your Pain* (2011) re-staged conversations originally held among politicians, while *Stand Behind Me* (2013) imagined vox pops between TV producers and the typical man or woman on the street. James Richards and Steve Reinke, in a different key, created *Disambiguation* (2009), a latter-day mail art piece that is the result of a literal correspondence between the two artists. People are talking, and talking, and to each other.

Often these characters are modelled after the artists themselves. Stark’s *My Best Thing*, for example, in which two chunky avatars have a conversation over a period of weeks about each other’s lives, interspersed by sex talk, was inspired by a chat Stark had in an online forum with
an Italian documentary-maker. A running story throughout concerns an artist based in Los Angeles who is making a work for the Venice Biennale — and indeed, My Best Thing was the LA-based Stark’s contribution to the 2011 Venice Biennale. Similarly, Israel, in his slickly produced faux-TV interviews, plays himself as the celebrity interviewer; Richards and Reinke chose the stock material for Disambiguation as personal choices; and Atkins based the avatar in Us Dead Talk Love on himself, affixing the modelling software’s sensors to his body so that it is he who performs the actions in the video. Scourti, as we shall see below, assiduously mines the confusion between autobiography and fiction characteristic of confessional work. That these partially autobiographical characters are developed via the formal device of a dialogue has important consequences. Rather than being set out through positive statements, the use of the dialogue means these characters’ identities emerge through the self-correcting and even dialectical process of conversation: identity is given in concert with another. And, secondly, the dialogue form enables a public performance of identity — of ‘who’ the protagonist ‘is’, both for the interlocutor and the work’s viewer. It reflects an obsession, even narcissistic in character, with one’s identity, but also a conception of identity as not controllable by one’s self, but determined and organised by factors beyond one’s scope. As with Krauss’s reading of monologue within video, dialogue in recent work thus reflects back on an interest in the representation of identity.7 In the use of the video monitor as mirror in works by Bruce Nauman, Lynda Benglis, Vito Acconci and others, Krauss identified a strategy to close the gap between self and representation. ‘Mirror-reflection’, she writes, ‘implies the vanquishing of separateness. Its inherent movement is towards fusion […] of illusionistically erasing the difference between subject and object.’ Underwritten by an interest in video technology’s ability for instantaneous feedback, these artists pursued the quasi-Romantic goal of a unity of subject and object, of self and representation or apprehension of self, of thought and action, which was to be expressed via the body through the consciousness of self. Krauss continues: ‘Self-encapsulation — the body or psyche as its own surround — is everywhere to be found in the corpus of video art.’ By contrast, the emphasis on picturing a relationship with an other in more recent work suggests a focus on the gap between one’s notion of one’s own identity and its representation out in the world; this involves a movement away from fusion, towards a split subject and object, and towards a character for whom the look of others is constitutive of him- or herself. Likewise, the sublimation of this body into a digital avatar or acted character underscores the transition away from the body as a site of authenticity and towards an aesthetics of representation.

This acknowledgement of a public horizon within identity in current work also reflects broader shifts in framing identity in artistic practice since the 1970s. The work that Krauss discusses was more allied to modernist concerns of self-reflexivity and autonomy than the recent work mentioned here, which is more discursive both in origin (most of these videos are scripted — another key difference from Krauss’s group of artists) and in nature. Since the 1970s, art has been changed by major debates in identity politics, feminism and postcolonialism, and the ‘self’ is now less often conceived as a psychologically coherent whole and more as a number of subject positions represented in a public field.8 The Freudian and Lacanian terms in which Krauss reads her subjects are now seen to omit the social, economic, political, gender and racial concerns that form and complicate subjectivity.

The connection of these works to the internet, either as a mode of dissemination or by aping internet formats such as the chat room, further complicates the notion of ‘identity’, with online sociality informing identity in ways that are not yet known.9 The abiding cliché of online sociality holds that one’s identity online is made up not of character traits (‘he or she is a good person’, ‘at times stubborn’, ‘keen to do the unexpected’), or even of a Foucauldian subject position, but of one’s likes and dislikes and the friends and acquaintances one is connected to. Describing one of his video projects, Ryan Trecartin, whose work is widely seen as epitomising modes of online sociality, says: ‘The basic idea of the film is that what identifies people is not necessarily their bodies anymore; it’s all the relationships they maintain with others. You are your area, rather than you are yourself.’

This social media-inspired observation suggests a move towards identity as a function of style — a consumerist self-cladding. This, as I think is generally acknowledged, is simplistic, overstating one’s influence on how one is seen by others, and ignoring the economic and social realities that determine one’s likes and dislikes. But it suggests the intimacy with which online life and identity are bound up, and, moreover, the idea of identity online as performative in the extreme — something created and then energetically maintained for the online public at
large. Stark, for example, describes how she came to make *My Best Thing* after realising that in the video chat rooms she frequented 'I was performing myself ... being myself but on a keyboard'. Scourti's *Life in AdWords* project lampoons this feedback loop between online presence and private identity: for nearly a year, Scourti emailed her diary to herself on Gmail, and then read out the Google advertisements that Gmail suggested for her on a daily video capture, which she then edited into a video that is shown both in exhibitions and online. Scourti's self-portrait is thus created entirely from the feedback of others — and not even others, but a for-profit computer program: she is only how the algorithm sees her. 'Find new friends. Stress and anxiety. Social anxiety disorder. Stress. Anxiety.' 'Coach travel. Ticket booking. Bus travel. Booking bus ticket.' 'Wine vineyards. Red wine glasses. Live theatre tickets. Anger management.' 'Trip to Geneva. English conversation. Stress and anxiety. Natural stress relief.' Scourti comes across as a nervous wreck, and it is worth noting that though this project is billed as deriving from a genuine diary, its caricature and exaggeration are impossible to ignore. Scourti, a young, single woman, plays a young, single woman, with mascara caked under her eyes and a raging hangover. This cliché of the dysfunctional singleton is indeed more constitutive of the identity she has adopted than the Google ads she reads out — a fact she seems aware of but omits in the project itself. Here Krauss's diagnosis of the artist's exploration of the gulf between lived subjectivity and public perception returns, except that *Life in AdWords* suggests a move not of reconciliation, but of surrender.

It is in this mode of a literal performance of the self on the internet that dialogue becomes such an important picturing tool for artists, as a means to reflect the idea of identity as created in a field both of publicness and of uncertain response. Krauss's motif of the mirror is again echoed in Scourti's remark that 'looking into the web is like looking into a mirror — except that the mirror is broken into pieces and you have no idea what part of you people see.' Indeed, communication on the internet is both poly-vocal and notional. One puts things online so that other people can see them, and comment on if they wish — but one has no idea, of course, who will. This is largely unprecedented as a mode of communication, both in terms of the multiplicity of the discussion, and the uncertainty of any reply. The ambiguity perhaps induces the self-consciousness of styling that accompanies online postings and the online performance of identity in general, as people only reply or acknowledge one's contribution — an Instagram picture, a Facebook or Twitter post, a Tumblr upload — if the post or image is interesting enough, or if one wants to be connected to that person. In most physical conversations, social convention or basic human empathy guarantee a response to most comments, regardless of their quality. On the internet, it's just shots in the dark — a big, blind pantomime, where success is measured by a time-lag applause-o-meter. It is no surprise that anxiety has emerged as a leitmotif in writings on the internet.

The trend towards publicity also reflects the basic fact that lives in the West are now more public than could ever have been imagined. It's a truism that Andy Warhol's 'In the future, everyone will be famous for fifteen minutes' has become true, but it is no less shocking that it has — or at least 'fifteen minutes' has stretched out into a state of semi-permanence, and 'famous' means something rather less than it did for Warhol. Much recent US work in

Frances Stark, My Best Thing, 2011, digital video on flash-drive, colour, sound, 1h 40min, stills. Courtesy the artist; Marc Foxx, Los Angeles; Gavin Brown's Enterprise, New York; greengrassi, London and Galerie Daniel Buchholz, Cologne/Berlin.

particular addresses the significance of celebrity culture both in the unresolved attitude towards celebrities’ twin normalcy and exceptionalness, and in the media’s flattening out of coverage so that personal lives become public matters for celebrities, politicians and ‘normal people’ alike. While Israel’s and Kline’s celebrity Q&As — which are not themselves the most interesting of conceits — clearly reflect the role of a celebrity as someone you could ‘get to know’ in an intimate, almost possessive way (Kline’s interviews, for example, are with Kurt Cobain and Whitney Houston, two figures with nostalgic value for his generation), Liz Magic Laser’s I Feel Your Pain, realised during Performa 11 in New York, addressed how politics now overlaps with tawdry telenovelas. In I Feel Your Pain characters sitting anonymously amongst the performance’s audience in a cinema staged re-enactments of famous recent political feuds, with these also projected live onto the main screen — thus spreading the locus of drama onto both the screen and the stalls. Everywhere, the dramaturgy suggested, is a public playing field, not just the proscenium stage; every audience member is also a potential actor. And engagement with politics, it proposes, in a nice breath of critique, is moving further away from real political issues and towards a play-by-play of scandal.

* Richards and Reinke’s Disambiguation, which was formed from but does not show a conversation, presents itself as a performance of interests, echoing the idea of identity online as a parade of one’s likes and dislikes. However, it wrestles with the question of publicness and privatness differently to the other works under discussion, and in a way that I would argue derives from its ties to materiality. The artists collaborated by posting to each other, through the mail, selections of their personal archives of television footage ripped onto DVDs — cumulatively making an hour-long compendium of mostly weird, unhip, psychedelic things, alongside some cartoons and pornography (the latter of which both have used in their practices). After delivering the material to each other they also spent time, in this alternating fashion, adding or changing sound layers, and preparing the final version. Reinke is explicit about the odd public dimensions of this rather private work:

I loved what we made, but had no idea if others would. [...] I was initially afraid that Jim [Richards] and I had made what amounted to the perfect television for me, a personal psychic TV programme... [But] many viewers get sucked into the thing. It takes over their minds and their lives, for the next three or four days at least, [and they] are better for it.

Moreover, by referring to it as a ‘personal psychic TV programme’ (not, for example, a ‘YouTube crawl’, which would have been my immediate association), Reinke underlines the distance that he wants to put between this work and the immaterial world of the digital — most obviously glimpsed in the almost deliberately retrograde manner by which Richards and Reinke made the work. Instead of emailing or Dropbox-ing or WeTransfer-ing or Yousendit-ing — e.g. all the other, easier ways one could do this — it is significant that Richards and Reinke transferred the footage onto physical discs, posted to each other across the ocean, from Chicago to London and back again. Disambiguation, that is, feels purposely out of step, and if not closed to audiences, then searching not for the infinite horizon of online sociality but the self-curated viewership of late-night TV. But Disambiguation is also something more basic. Of all the conversations under discussion here, it is the only ‘real’ one of actual question and answer. And the materiality is perhaps simply a bid for intimacy between the two men: a throwback to the talismanic magic of holding something someone else once held in his or her hands; the affective material aspect of the exchange of letters that the conception of them as mere text forgets.

Indeed, the other major shift away from Krauss’s — excuse the pun — corpus is each generation’s treatment of materiality and the body. While the body as a site of authentic and unique experience motivated much of the 1970s work, in many of these post-internet generation works the body appears as iterated, reproducible and a poor version of itself. Atkins’s Us Dead Talk Lose sets up a situation of mourning for the loss of the materiality of the body. In a two-screen projection, two digitally rendered heads, described by Atkins as ‘cadavers’, discuss the corporeality missing in the digital world, specifically an eyelash that has been caught in foreskin, which is read both as metonymy for the real attributes of real sex, and, in invoking the link between sex and death, adds a further undercurrent of death throughout the work. The artist has elsewhere spoken of the ‘violence’ he does to his body by dematerialising it and turning it into code.14 (He ends up, notably, as dead.)

Charlotte Prodger, for the installation D.O. (2014) at this year’s Glasgow International, put

into ‘conversation’ a voice reading sections of the catalogue of Electronic Arts Intermix, New York, and a video track showing digital abstractions rendered in a deliberately unreal, uncanny environment. They played from a monitor on a plinth scaled to human height, forcing the viewer to confront the body twice in absentia, both as a disembodied voice and a dematerialised abstraction. Stark’s My Best Thing — the title of which refers to the male member of one of the interlocutors — similarly reduces the specificity of the figures on screen to Adam-and-Eve-like generic stand-ins (in contrast to the wit and careful attention given to the prose). That is, rather than the body acting as an arena of immediacy, of a heightened place of conflation between thought and performance, or mental and physical experience, the body in these contemporary works is subjected to processes of representational reduction and material obliteration.

It is also instructive to think back to Jeffrey Deitch’s ‘Post-Human’ exhibition (1992–93), which, like this essay, took as its jumping-off point the changes to the self wrought by new communication technologies. In his catalogue essay for the show Deitch echoes Marshall McLuhan (and Atkins) in describing how technologies can take the place of the body itself. The text is remarkably prescient, outlining how one can be ‘present’ remotely.

We are also already well on our way to assimilating a new set of nearly post-human social structures. These new types of social behaviours first seemed to assert themselves in the realm of mating rituals. The social dislocations that began to isolate young people from their traditional family and community networks led to numerous artificial structures to facilitate introductions. First there were personal ads and singles clubs, then singles bars and an organised singles industry. Now, with the threat of AIDS and perhaps a growing sense of human alienation, phone sex has become especially popular. People can conduct fantasy relationships without the mess that often goes along with real human contact. From phone sex it is only a small step to virtual sex. The multi-sensual sexual experience that people will soon be able to have in three dimensions with their home computer. A virtual-sex program featuring every simulated sound and sensation is not only likely to be better in many ways than the real thing, for future generations it may become the real thing. In Japan, which, as in other areas, is in the vanguard of post-human behaviour, there has emerged a new personality type known as otaku. Otaku people are defined more by their possessions than by their inherent character. They can be described as a concept of person-as-information.

However, the response that Deitch details in his exhibition to this new conception of self is precisely the return of the figure: the intense interest at the time in figurative sculpture in the work of, for example, Charles Ray, Félix González-Torres, Mike Kelley or Martin Kippenberger. Deitch sees this as coming in a chain of artistic responses to the construction of the self, from the ethos of Humanism that can be glimpsed in the portraits of Hans Holbein to the Freudian anguish evidenced in the figures of Oskar Kokoschka. For Deitch, the threat that technologies pose centres on genetic alterations and enhancements to the body, forcing an anxiety around the body that can be seen in Kelley’s conflations of humans and animals, Robert Gober’s dismembered anatomical parts or Paul McCarthy’s mixings of man and machine. Though the body is treated differently today — the emphasis on the abject and the bodily has given way to cleaness and digitisation — ‘Post-Human’ signalled a return to a realist idiom that is significant here.

Part of the impetus for showing the body in the process of reduction or as a victim of violence is as a means to thematise immateriality more generally — what is more arresting than the loss of one’s physical body? Like the turn in the 1990s away from abstraction, the works here suggest a mode of writing and representation that couldn’t be farther from the autonomy of classic Modernism. Except for that of Disambiguation, the conversations are obviously scripted. Us Dead Talk Love is quite clearly a single-authored rumination formatted into a two-part conversation: neither ‘part’ has a voice or characterisation different from the other. Similarly, for My Best Thing Stark re-scripted a conversation she’d had online into a representation of itself — a metafactual and writerly facet also signalled via many allusions to David Foster Wallace. (She has also said interacting with people on chat sites was like ‘pulling stories’ out of them — explicitly relating My Best Thing and its origins to writing.)

One problem with the term ‘internet art’ is that art made by a single subject is so alien as to be contradictory of the real modalities of the internet. Thus, the aspirational implications of Camille Henrot’s film showing the cataloguing and the contents of the National Science Library in Washington, DC (Grosse Fatigue, 2013), seen as if they were computer desktop windows in a comparison between the material Library’s archive and the internet-as-archive,
are contravened by the fact that the film is made by a single artist opening simulated desktop windows. Stark’s dialogue, though based on Xtranormal software, was ultimately edited offline in the manner of a traditional film. Atkins’s Us Dead Talk Love, which ruminates on the immateriality of the digital age, was made by a man sitting in a chair at a computer, and is projected by a material projector onto a material screen. What these works are trying to make is the image of the internet — the image of techniques or of various invisible processes of communication. And in picturing online identity, it is significant that the character they portray is split: one cannot exist online, these works suggest, without a public watching, reading or listening.

The concept of the dialogic, developed by the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin in the 1930s as a means to acknowledge the fluidity of language’s meaning, is salient to these works not just for the conspicuous link to the formal device of the dialogue that they use. Looking at the form of the novel, and especially the writings of Fyodor Dostoevsky, Bakhtin used the term ‘dialogic’ to show that an utterance implies a response in its very construction; or, as Michael Holquist, who helped introduce Bakhtin to Western readers, writes: ‘Language, when it means, is somebody talking to someone else, even when that someone is one’s own inner addressee.’ All words are in conversation with past and even future words, and thus their meaning is never stable or fixed. The dialogic thus reveals the inherent intertextuality or heteroglossia of language and the relational construction of meaning, and shows how the becoming of the self through language is dependent on context — something that, suddenly, is under threat online.

The speed and ‘context collapse’ of communication on the internet — where images and texts are traded so quickly that their original context becomes irrelevant — means that the internet has become a microcosm of the centrifugal nature of language that Bakhtin saw as both its defining characteristic and its ideal. The surprisingly prevalent move of contemporary artists to picture foils to themselves suggests a desire to resist this obliteration of context, to push not for a synthesis of self and surround but rather for a specificity and authored characterisation of both. That is, artists today seem to want to typify and organise what surrounds them, giving it shape within a specific context so that identity — the language used to express it and the reaction it receives — becomes neither unmoored nor totally beyond control.

An earlier version of this essay was delivered at the conference ‘Shimmering World’, University of Manchester, 25 April 2014.

Footnotes
4. Ibid., pp.56—57. ↑
5. Ibid., p.53. ↑


10. Interestingly, none of the artists surveyed have changed their gender, age or ethnicity online, though this is apparently common practice in chat rooms. The implication is a concern with the performance of one’s real identity, rather than performativeness as a notional construct or with a critique of the construction of identity. ↑

11. Conversation with the artist, May 2014. ↑


15. ‘Post-Human’, curated by Jeffrey Deitch, FAE Mus.e d’Art Contemporain, Pully, Lausanne, 14 June—13 September 1992; Castello di Rivoli, Museo d’Arte Contemporanea, Rivoli, Turin, 1 October—22 November 1992; Deste Foundation for Contemporary Art, Athens, 3 December 1992—14 February 1993; Deichtorhallen Hamburg, 12 March—9 May 1993. In its representation of a turn to the figurative, ‘Post-Human’ largely ignored the way ‘post-human’ was used within cybernetics and media arts at the time. Likewise, the notion of ‘feedback’ online is here taken to refer to content rather than a formal mode. ↑

16. Jeffrey Deitch, *Post-Human* (exh. cat.), Lausanne: FAE Mus.e d’Art Contemporain, 1992, unpaginated. And elsewhere: ‘The fascinating collapse of the border between public and private lives is also explored through[nKaren] Kilimnik’s work, evidenced by the new approaches to the private versus public, in everything from the scrutiny of the personal lives of political candidates to the behind-the-scenes revelations of Madonna’s *Truth or Dare* [1991], our entire understanding of the meaning of private life is in the process of being redefined.’ *Ibid.* ↑

17. ‘Frances Stark on *My Best Thing*, op. cit. ↑